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New Public Management Reform in European Countries:  
The Retreat of the State from Telecommunication Services  
ABSTRACT 
In the post-war period, telecommunications – being services of “general economic in-
terest” – were initially managed by public administrative bodies in many Western Euro-
pean countries. With the rise of New Public Management (NPM) in the 1980s, these 
bodies were often transformed into public corporations or joint stock companies. Fol-
lowing corporatisation, the provision and the management of these services of general 
economic interest was gradually transferred to private actors. This paper analyses 
whether privatisation, as part of NPM reforms, has benefited the consumer. We have, 
therefore, compiled data on privatisation in the telecommunication sector for 15 Euro-
pean countries from 1980 to 2006. The data set covers the corporatisation process, as 
well as the transfer of the service provision to the private sector. Three empirical find-
ings stand out: first, the reform processes have differed widely from each other. Second, 
it’s not just the transfer of ownership to the private sector that has ensured efficiency 
gains and increased consumer benefits; corporatisation has done this as well. Third, ef-
ficiency gains have been transferred to the consumer, especially at the beginning of the 
reform process. 
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New Public Management Reform in European Countries:  
The Retreat of the State from Telecommunication Services  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
During recent decades, governments all over Europe have introduced new modes of 
governance (Lane 1997). Under the label of “New Public Management” (NPM), gov-
ernments have modernised accountability and control, changed organisational structures 
and have introduced market-type mechanisms. Indeed, “public management reform 
consists of deliberate changes to the structure and processes of public sector organisa-
tions with the objective of getting them (in some sense) to run better” (Pollitt and 
Boueckaert 2004, p.8). One instrument used under the rubric of NPM is the privatisation 
of public enterprises (Lane 1997, p.593, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Pollitt et al. 
2007). 
The reform process in the public utilities sector has been placed under particular 
scrutiny. Traditionally it was the state that was responsible for supplying goods and ser-
vices of general economic interest. In the meantime, governments all over the world 
have partly or completely privatised these sectors (OECD 2003), with the main objec-
tives being to improve quality and reduce costs by increasing efficiency. In fact, the 
evidence shows that efficiency levels have increased due to privatisation and market 
liberalisation (Megginson and Netter 2001), and that public service delivery has been 
particularly affected (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). 
We focus on the telecommunication sector because it has played a dominant role in 
past privatisation policies throughout OECD countries (OECD 2003). We further con-
centrate on Europe since telecommunication services here have traditionally been pro-
vided by public administrative bodies, and Europe has been “the continent most in-
volved in the phenomenon” of privatisation (Bortolotti and Siniscalco 2004, p.2).  
From a public choice perspective, privatisation policies are designed by self inter-
ested politicians considering the voters’ preferences in order to win the next election. 
Since the consumers represent a significant constituency of voters we have chosen to 
evaluate the effect of the reforms on the consumer. We are particularly interested in 
how privatisation affects the interaction between the quantity, quality and price of tele-
communication services. In order to address this question, we first developed a new 
indicator to measure the extent of public entrepreneurship and applied it to the tele-
communications sector. The self-compiled database offers a unique opportunity to have 
a broad-based international comparison of privatisation across European countries, sec-
tors and over time. We then established an index for consumer benefits which combines 
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indicators taken from the International Telecommunication Union Indicators Database 
for quantity, quality and price of telecommunication services (ITU 2007). We then car-
ried out a study of 15 European countries for the period 1980 to 20061, which was ex-
plicitly aimed at overcoming the shortcomings in the empirical literature in the fields of 
NPM and economics. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II reviews the empirical literature of NPM 
and discusses its shortcomings, as well as the concepts and theories of privatisation and 
consumer benefits. Section III illustrates the measurement of our main independent va-
riable and our dependent variable, in addition to providing descriptive results for both 
indicators. Section IV presents the regression results and section V provides a conclu-
sion.  
2 EFFECTS OF NPM REFORMS – THE CASE OF PRIVATISATION 
2.1 Empirical Review 
Privatisation has many different faces (OECD 2003; Megginson and Netter 2001; Dain-
tith 1994). In the telecommunications sector, formal privatisation – a change in legal 
status to more commercially oriented organisational forms – and material privatisation – 
the divestment of public enterprises – have both played a decisive role (OECD 2005; 
Lane 2000). The effects of formal and material privatisation (as instruments of NPM) on 
network-based utilities are discussed in the literature in the fields of both NPM and eco-
nomics. 
The NPM-literature emphasises the changing influence of administrative and politi-
cal actors, as well as the distinctive governance modes in traditional and modern forms 
of public administration accompanied by privatisation. Privatisation implies, among 
other things, the replacement of bureaucratic structures with commercial management 
and, thus, the liberation of administrative and economic processes from political deci-
sion-making (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Thynne 1994; Lane 2000). Liberated contract 
managers, with term-based or performance-based contracts, are solely responsible for 
the interests of the company, as opposed to ministers or bureaucrats with political re-
sponsibilities. In a privately held company, the management and the employees have 
more incentives to run the commercial business efficiently (Thynne 1994). Accordingly, 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) have developed an explanatory model for public manage-
ment reform and compare different instruments of NPM in twelve OECD countries.  
They further relate them to different reform outputs and illustrate these relationships 
with empirical examples. Additionally, Lane (1997, 2000) provides a comparison of the 
                                                 
1  Italy is excluded from the sample due to data availability issues.  
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efficiency of different public enterprises from a theoretical perspective. Self-perception 
data of executives is employed in Meyers and Verhoest (2006) to test if different man-
agement instruments and organisational forms make a difference in terms of the 
self-assessed quality of services and products. They did not find a relationship between 
the organisational form and the perceived performance of public sector organisations.   
With a particular focus on the consumer, the European Research Project PIQUE in-
vestigates the consequences of privatisation and liberalisation on employment, produc-
tivity and service quality in four sectors (electricity, postal services, healthcare and local 
transport) in six countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Poland, Sweden and the UK). 
By analysing primary and secondary data, they have drawn a diverse picture of the ef-
fects privatisation has on the consumer. They find that some quality aspects have im-
proved while others have deteriorated. Furthermore, not all consumers have benefited 
from the restructuring processes. Privatisation and liberalisation only appear to improve 
the quality public services when combined with an adequate regulatory policy (PIQUE 
2009; Flecker et al. 2008; Kilicaslan et al. 2008; Vael et al. 2008).   
In addition to studies on public administration, several empirical studies in the eco-
nomic literature analyse the effect of divestment (material privatisation) on the perform-
ance of (formerly) public enterprises. For instance, Bortolotti et al. (2002) examined the 
financial and operating performance of 31 telecommunication companies in 25 coun-
tries that were fully or partially privatised between 1981 and 1998. They found that the 
observed improvement mainly resulted from regulatory changes or in combination with 
privatisation, rather than from privatisation alone. Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) and Ros 
(1999) used panel data to analyse the impact of privatisation on expanded teledensity, 
operating efficiency, as well as the quality and pricing of telecom services. Unfortu-
nately, the results of privatisation in these studies were not conclusive. However, the 
studies agree that the combination of privatisation and liberalisation improve the effi-
ciency of services. 
D’Souza et al. (2005) state that privatisation itself has improved the profitability, ef-
ficiency, output and capital expenditure of divested firms in 23 OECD-countries. More-
over, in terms of the British and US telecommunications market, Kwoka (1993) finds 
that divestiture has had a positive effect on total factor productivity. However, McNary 
(2001) shows for the period 1987 to 1998 that privatisation had a negative impact on 
network penetration for about 200 countries when taking competition into account. A 
comprehensive overview on the effect of privatisation on efficiency is provided by 
Megginson and Netter (2001), who summarise existing empirical studies in the tele-
communications sector. Most of the studies reviewed support the view that divestments 
have a positive effect on efficiency.   
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In sum, several conclusions can be drawn. First, the discussions in the literature in 
the domains of NPM and economics take place separately from each other, with the 
economic literature focusing on material privatisation as the disposal of public enter-
prises. Second, most empirical studies in the economic literature analyse the effects of 
privatisation on efficiency and not on consumer benefits. Third, the NPM literature fo-
cuses on restructuring processes in general, not explicitly considering material privatisa-
tion. The most apparent gap, however, persists in terms of quantitative international 
comparisons, where a systematic investigation of formal privatisation is completely 
missing. The NPM literature is dominated by conceptual work or case studies and quan-
titative research is strongly underrepresented.  
2.2 Privatisation and Consumer Benefits: Concepts, Theory and 
Hypotheses 
Formal privatisation is understood as a change in legal status to more commercially 
oriented organisational forms. It is not possible to sell shares and initiate material priva-
tisation before the public enterprise in question has been formally privatised. Despite 
national differences, three forms of formal privatisation can be distinguished.  
1) The first type of formal privatisation (I) refers to the transformation of a depart-
mental agency (e.g., the Bundesanstalt für Post und Telekommunikation) into a public 
corporation (e.g., the Deutsche Bundespost) that is subject to special or public law. 
While a departmental agency does not have its own legal personality, a public corpora-
tion is an autonomous public body with its own legal status and a partly commercial 
structure. Although the objectives of a public corporation are often defined by law or 
statute, it has more autonomy in day-to-day operations than a departmental agency 
(Boes 1986).  
2) The second type of formal privatisation (II) involves changing a public corpora-
tion into a state company that is subject to private law, such as a joint stock company 
(e.g., Deutsche Post AG). A state company is subject to the same rules as private com-
panies. In contrast to public corporations or departmental agencies, state companies are 
only responsible for the well-being of the enterprise itself. The state, however, remains 
the unique stakeholder (Boes 1986).  
3) The third type of formal privatisation (III) refers to the direct transformation of a 
departmental agency into a state company that is subject to private law.  
Figure 1 (p. 5) illustrates the conceptualisation of formal and material privatisation. 
In the following we use this concept of privatisation as the framework for our analysis.  
Given that markets function perfectly, public choice theory argues that government 
intervention leads to inefficient outcomes and, for that reason, private solutions are pre-
ferred (Mueller 2003). However, in network based utilities like telecommunication, 
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market failure has traditionally justified public intervention (Boes 1986). Yet, the belief 
that market failure can be solved by public ownership has recently been challenged. In 
particular economic theory argues that public ownership affects the maximisation prob-
lem of the firm in two ways. First, the objective function is distorted. In contrast to pri-
vate actors, politicians, as representatives of the people, have to fulfill other objectives 
in addition to maximising profits, such as maximising total employment (Shleifer 1998; 
Boycko et al. 1996; Laffont and Tirole 1991, 1993; Shapiro and Willig 1990; Sapping-
ton and Stiglitz 1987). Thus, once a company has a private owner, fewer resources are 
spent on pursuing goals that do not relate specifically to profit maximisation. Second, 
public enterprises face a “soft budget” constraint which distorts their incentives to un-
dertake reasonable investments or to manage operations cost-effectively. This is due to 
the fact that the government is often legally obligated to bail them out in case of losses 
or bankruptcy (Sheshinski and Lopez Calva 2003; Schmidt 1990).  
Figure 1: Conceptualisation of Privatisation 
 
 
It is particularly the formal privatisation of public enterprises that changes budgetary 
arrangements as well as other corporate governance techniques. Accordingly, the eco-
nomic literature stresses the importance of corporate governance techniques as an im-
portant tool in resolving agency problems and, thereby, increasing efficiency at the 
company level (Pagano and Volpin 2005; Coffee 1999; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Moreover, changing the legal status of a public entity also affects its ability to raise 
funds externally (cf. OECD 2003, p.21). New capital is essential, especially in capital 
intensive industries like network-based utilities, in order to maintain the network, to 
access new markets, to invest in service delivery, and to invest in research and devel-
opment (R&D) for the purposes of improving quality or creating new products (Noam 
2004). Last but not least, fewer bureaucratic processes within the company facilitate 
adaptation to new situations (Munari et al. 2002; Karpoff 2001; Wright et al. 2000; 
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Zahra et al. 2000). By selling assets (material privatisation), the government greatly 
relinquishes control. Although, it often maintains control via golden shares or ultimate 
ownership (Bortolotti and Faccio 2008; OECD 2003), its overall influence decreases 
(Boubakri et al. 2005). Since profits are mainly owned by private shareholders, the in-
centives to work efficiently improve. The ownership structure is therefore important for 
efficiency (Short 1994). Nonetheless, the level of efficiency for the network based utili-
ties depends not only on the ownership structure, but also on the market structure. For 
instance, a private monopoly does not necessarily operate more efficiently than a public 
one. Therefore, a competitive market is one important precondition for realising the full 
benefits of privatisation (Newberry 1997). The potential problem of market power abuse 
is indicated by empirical evidence which shows that in less competitive markets the 
operational efficiency is smaller whilst profitability goes up (Boubakri and Cosset 1997; 
D´Souza and Megginson 1998) 
Whether or not efficiency gains translate into consumer benefits depends on the way 
in which the maximisation problem of the consumer is affected. In general, utility is 
determined by the quantity, price, and quality of goods and services as well as dispos-
able income. The effect on the consumer depends on the trade-off between costs and 
benefits. Although we do not know the individual preferences that are necessary for 
deriving individual utility levels, overall we hypothesise that privatisation increases 
consumer benefits. Privatisation facilitates the investments necessary for expanding 
networks, which leads to an increase in supply and an increase in access to goods and 
services. In addition, more efficient production should result in lower prices and a better 
quality product.  
3 PRIVATISATION AND CONSUMER BENEFITS:  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EUROPE 
3.1 Measurement and Description of Privatisation 
One of the central drawbacks of the existing empirical literature is the use of privatisa-
tion indicators, since none of these incorporate formal privatisation. A combination of 
formal and material privatisation measures is missing. Furthermore, material privatisa-
tion is measured mainly by summing up the proceeds from the sale, which is not the 
most accurate approach (Etling et al. 2009). This prevents a comprehensive picture of 
privatisation from being drawn. In contrast, we have developed an index that brings 
together the concepts of formal and material privatisation. The index relates economic 
output indicators (total revenues and number of employees) for the formally or materi-
ally privatised telecommunication provider to national economic reference indicators 
for each year and per country (gross national product (GNP) and sectoral employment) 
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and therefore provides internationally comparative data.2 It therefore accurately meas-
ures the participation of the state in the national economy and in sectoral employment. 
Based on this information a completely new database containing data from all relevant 
public enterprises is generated.3 The Index is calculated formally:  
 
(1)   
 
The index identifies the type of organisational 
form (DA, PC, SC) and the percentage of shares 
owned by the government (s) on an annual basis, 
and combines this information with the respective 
outputs of the given year (X).4 Formal and mate-
rial privatisation is weighted equally, whereas 
formal privatisation is subdivided into two differ-
ent types. If more than one publicly owned firm 
operates in the sector, then the index sums the weighted outputs over all firms. The 
weighted outputs are finally set in reference to an overall measure of output, i.e., GNP 
or total sectoral employment.5 Once a firm becomes completely privately owned (s=0), 
it drops out of the index. The index therefore measures the part of the total economic 
output (sectoral employment) in the telecoms sector provided (employed) by the state.  
To illustrate the national privatisation paths, the following figures show the devel-
opment of the state’s entrepreneurial activities in the telecommunications sector. The 
horizontal axis illustrates the year of observation, while the vertical axis displays the 
index value of the state’s entrepreneurial activities. The graphs on the left-hand side 
illustrate the total revenues provided by the state in relation to gross national product in 
US-Dollars, while the graphs on the right-hand side indicate the number of employees 
                                                 
2  To compile this database, information from national governments, regulatory agencies, national laws, and public 
enterprises was collected, compiled and analysed. The index is also developed for other sectors and for each 
national economy.  
3  Missing values with regard to the number of employees were estimated using the trend of the national sectoral 
employment. With regard to total revenues, missing values were estimated in accordance with the development of 
GNP, since no sectoral data exists. If no data was available at all, missing values were assumed to be constant.  
4  Qualitative data for our sample of companies is displayed in Table A1 
5  GNP data as a reference is taken since GDP data does not include international revenues. Since the revenues from 
each company include sales from international transactions, GDP is an inaccurate reference. 
j
SCi
SC
ij
SC
ij
PC
j
DA
j
j X
sXXX
I j



 2
1
4
3 n_j enterprises in sector j, i_j=1,…,n_j enter-
prises 
E set of 3 types of enterprises: E={DA,PC,SC} 
where 
DA: set of departmental agencies 
PC: set of public corporations 
SC: set of state companies 
X^k: joint output (number of employees and 
total revenues) of all enterprises of type k 
in E 
X: Sector-j-specific joint output of all enter-
prises of type k in E 
X^k_ji: single firm output in j of type k in E 
s^k_ij: relative share of publicly held shares of 
firm i in j of k in E (only if applicable(*)) 
where: 
s^DA_ij=s^PC_ij=1 for all ij (*) 
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in state-owned enterprises in relation to total employment in the telecommunication and 
postal sector.6 
Figure 2: Public Entrepreneurship in the Telecommunications Sector 1980 - 2006 
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6  To avoid visual confusion the sample is divided into several historical and geographically-based families of na-
tions. 
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Figure 2 reveals several interesting facts. First, the European countries vary strongly 
with regard to their point of departure in 1980. In the Netherlands, for instance, more 
than 70% of the sectoral employment (post office + telecoms) was accounted for by the 
public telecommunication provider. In Ireland more than 80% of the sectoral labour 
force was employed in a departmental agency. In contrast, in other countries, such as 
Spain, only about 10% of sectoral employment was accounted for by the public tele-
communication provider. The same holds true for the total revenues. In 1980, entrepre-
neurial state activities formed a relatively large part of gross national product in some 
countries (in Greece >8% and about 4% in Switzerland), while much less in others (less 
than 1% in Spain). Second, in addition to the different initial situations, the privatisation 
trajectories of the European countries examined also demonstrate remarkable differ-
ences. In the German speaking countries, the level of state entrepreneurial activities 
remained constant from 1980 to 1990, when the formal privatisation process started. 
Moreover, in these countries, the state only retreated moderately from entrepreneurial 
activities. In contrast, Ireland and Spain restructured their telecommunications sectors 
very quickly and have radically privatised their national telecommunication providers. 
Others started the privatisation process early, such as the Scandinavian countries, 
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though the reform process has been characterised by many reform steps. It is interesting 
to note that although the starting positions of the countries and their subsequent privati-
sation paths have differed greatly, they have now almost converged with regard to the 
extent of state entrepreneurial activity. This observation gives rise to the question of 
how to evaluate this development. In the following section we examine the impact of 
NPM reforms on the consumer and then conclude whether the reforms were beneficial 
or not.  
3.2 Measurement and Description of Consumer Benefits 
All of our telecommunication indicators are taken from the ITU Telecommunication 
Indicators Database (2007). Our composed indicator includes four indicators, i.e., two 
quantity indicators, one cost indicator and one indicator for quality. According to our 
argument, the utility of the consumer is affected by more than one dimension. There-
fore, we focus on a combined measurement of consumer benefits.  In order to measure 
the coverage and the network development we looked at the number of main fixed lines 
(FIX) and mobile subscriptions (MOBILE) per 100 inhabitants. We then merged 
MOBILE and FIX into one indicator for coverage (COVERAGE). A combination of both 
is necessary to avoid a structural bias. Some countries have developed faster in the mo-
bile sector than others, sometimes to compensate for a lack of investment in network 
expansion for the fixed-line sector (Calabrese et al. 2002). Only looking at the fixed-line 
market would paint an incomplete picture. The dimension of price is approximated by 
the indicator for monthly subscription fees for a fixed line (COSTS).7 Finally, we in-
cluded a quality measure which is the percentage of digital lines (QUALITY). This indi-
cator approximates the quality dimension, since new services are provided when digital 
lines are available. These include conference calls, faster dial-ups, call waiting, faster 
internet connections and Caller ID.8 The interaction of all indicators taken together is 
one possible way to approximate the overall consumer benefits. Each indicator that en-
ters the index for consumer benefits (CONSUMER) was continuous and normalised 
from 0 to 1. For normalization, we took the highest and the lowest value of the sample 
as the benchmark and, thus, constructed an index that ranges from 0 to 1. COSTS are 
rescaled so that low values indicate high prices. Formally:  
                                                 
7  Unit prices for fixed and mobile lines, as well as monthly subscription costs for mobile lines contain too many 
missing values for our time period, meaning that their inclusion would lead to more gaps in information than in-
formation gained. 
8  Other indicators from the database such as “waiting lists for fixed lines” or “faults cleared by next day” are also 
interesting but the amount of missing values is not acceptable for our purposes, either. 
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It covers different dimensions and, thus, enables a more differentiated picture of con-
sumer benefits than a mere analysis of pure output.9  The correlation matrix indicates 
that the three indicators measure a latent dimension, which has also been confirmed by a 
rotated principal component analysis. Therefore it is appropriate to sum up the indica-
tors in an additive index. 
Figure 3 shows the average development of the three dimensions COSTS, 
COVERAGE, QUALITY as well as the overall consumer benefits (CONSUMER) for our 
entire sample.10 The horizontal axis displays the yearly averages of the different indica-
tors. The vertical axis illustrates the development over time.  
Figure 3: Consumer Benefits for 16 European Countries 1990 - 2005 
CONSUMER (solid) COVERAGE (dash) COSTS (dot) QUALITY (dash-dot) 
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It is obvious that overall consumer benefits increase over time. However, the develop-
ment of the different indicators is not simultaneous. While quality and quantity clearly 
show an upward development, costs have increased moderately over time. Nonetheless, 
the increase in costs has not outweighed the positive effects of increased quantity and 
quality. Figure 4 (p. 12) shows the development of consumer benefits for each country.  
Although the overall development of consumer benefits display similarities, differ-
ences remain between countries. In some countries, such as France and Spain, the slope 
of consumer benefits is very moderate, while other countries—such as Germany, Swit-
zerland and Greece–display a fast increase in consumer benefits over time. Second, the 
                                                 
9  The eigenvalue is 2.37 and the identified factor explains 59.25 per cent of the overall variance. 
10  The ITU database covers data for telecommunication services mainly from 1990 onwards.  
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initial level is very different. This gives rise to the question of how different privatisa-
tion policies impact this development.  
Figure 4: Consumer Benefits by Country 1990 - 2006 
.4
.6
.8
0
.2
1
.4
.6
.8
0
.2
1
.4
.6
.8
0
.2
1
.4
.6
.8
0
.2
1
1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005 1990 1995 2000 2005
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland
Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal
Spain Sweden Switzerland UK
 
4 REGRESSION 
In an effort to evaluate the effects of privatisation, we use our index of public entrepre-
neurship as the main independent variable.11 In order to be certain about the effect of 
privatisation, we control for additional explanatory factors. First of all, the newly priva-
tised firm’s performance is affected by the competitive environment. The issue of 
whether ownership or competition matters is widely discussed in the literature (e.g., 
Villalonga 2000; Ros 1999). The indicator used is the market share of new entrants 
(COMP) which is taken from the OECD regulatory database (Conway and Nicoletti 
2006). A high degree of market concentration negatively affects consumers, since prices 
are above the competitive level. Furthermore, we account for capital market develop-
ment. Investments in network expansions or R&D activities depend on the possibility of 
                                                 
11  Within the regression, we only employ the index for the total revenues and not for the number of employees 
because estimated results for both indices do not differ significantly. In order to avoid redundancy we skip the 
employee index for our estimation.  
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raising new funds to finance these activities (Noam 2004). Low capital market devel-
opment, high interest rates and unstable financial environments negatively affect  supply 
(Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1998), which might negatively affect the consumer 
(Noam 2004). The data employed is the MSCI Index from Standard and Poor’s, which 
measures market capitalisation and liquidity, and, thus, captures the capital market de-
velopment.12 We also argue that disposable income influences personal utility levels 
and, thus, GDP per capita (GDP) is included in order to control for different levels of 
economic well-being. The level of income influences the demand for quantity and qual-
ity. This, in turn, affects the possibilities that are available to the company.  
In the context of network-based utilities, technological progress plays an important 
role, especially by offering possibilities to overcome bottlenecks that inhibit competi-
tion. The emergence of the internet has been a very important milestone for the tele-
communications sector in particular (Lien and Peng 2001). According to Lien and Peng 
(2001), 1995 is seen as the year that the internet was introduced, which was when “tele-
communications transferred from a circuit-switch to a package-switch system” (p.61). 
We use a period dummy 1995 to 1997 to capture the lagged and non-immediate effects 
of this technological breaking point.13 We expect a positive influence on consumer ben-
efits. 
Some authors have argued that population density plays an important role in net-
work-based utilities (McNary 2001), since investments in networks and maintaining 
these networks is more profitable with higher population densities. Unit costs are lower, 
the more intensively the network is used. Consumer benefits are more likely to occur 
the higher the population density is (POP). The population density data is taken from 
EUROSTAT.  
Last, but not least, we control for the initial level of public entrepreneurship in 1980, 
labeled REVENUE_1980. We assume that the initial size will influence the dynamics of 
the reformed market. Specifically, we believe that the lower the initial level of public 
entrepreneurship the sooner efficiency gains will be realized and the more likely it will 
be for the consumer to benefit.  
We performed different kinds of statistical analyses using our sample. The Hausman-
Test (Hausman 1978) indicated the existence of unobserved heterogeneity. The litera-
ture suggests using first difference or fixed effect models (Wooldridge 2002). Since we 
were interested in the influence of changes in the entrepreneurial activities of the state 
                                                 
12  Note that a similar Index was taken for Greece, the IFCI Index Greece.  
13  Since there are other ways to control for technological progress, we checked for robustness by including other 
period and year dummies for the introduction of the internet and the GDP growth as a proxy. The results did not 
change substantially. 
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with regard to consumer benefits, two first difference models (FD) were applied (Model 
II and IV). In order to examine the level effects as well, two fixed effects models (FE) 
were employed (Model I and III).14 Unfortunately, fixed effect models do not allow for 
the estimation of time invariant variables and make the estimation of the effect of rarely 
changing variables inefficient. To enable the integration of population density and the 
initial level of entrepreneurship in our estimation, we additionally applied a fixed effects 
vector decomposition model (FEVD) (Model V and VI). In a fixed effects vector de-
composition model, the unit effect is first estimated by running an ordinary fixed effect 
model. The unit effect was then split into an explained and an unexplained part and the 
unit effects were regressed on the time-invariant and rarely changing explanatory vari-
ables. Third, a pooled OLS was estimated by including all explanatory variables and the 
unexplained part of the fixed effect vector (Plümper and Tröger 2007).15 Since a delayed 
effect of the reform on consumer benefits is plausible, Model III and IV include a one 
year lag variable for the central independent variable L1_REVENUE.   
When analysing panel data, several pitfalls exist and certain restrictions have to be 
considered. We therefore tested for the existence of autocorrelation in the residuals, 
mutlicollinearity, non-stationarity and heteroscedasticity. In order to test for autocorre-
lation, the residuals were regressed within a simple auxiliary OLS regression on all in-
dependent variables, including the delayed residuals. Additionally, we performed the 
Wooldridge Test for first order autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2002). For that reason the 
fixed effect and fixed effect vector decomposition models were estimated with autore-
gressive disturbances. We also performed an augmented Dickey Fuller test to check for 
stationarity. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity was rejected for CONSUMER. Mul-
ticollinearity was checked with pair-wise correlations of the independent variables, 
which do not indicate severe problems in any of the model specifications. To test for 
heteroscedasticity, we performed the White test using squared residuals as the depend-
ent variable of an auxiliary regression. We dealt with heteroscedasticity by estimating 
the first difference and fixed effect models with robust standard errors. Table 1 includes 
the results of the panel data estimations. 
                                                 
14  Both models lead to a consistent estimator in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
15  The Hausman Taylor estimator is only efficient when using appropriate instruments which have to be uncorre-
lated with the time-invariant and time-variant variables. Without appropriate instruments at hand, the fixed effects 
vector decomposition performs better than Hausman Taylor estimator (Plümper/Tröger 2007). 
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In the first specification, we controlled for competition, stock market development and 
GDP per capita. In this model, our privatisation variable is significant at the 1%-level. 
The results confirm our theoretical assumption that New Public Management reforms 
lead to an increase in consumer benefits. The same holds true for increasing competition 
and favourable stock market developments, which are both highly significant. Model II 
integrates a dummy year for the introduction of the internet in a panel fixed effects 
model with autoregressive disturbances (AR(1)). Our main independent variable again 
turns out to be highly significant. As in model I, the effect of competition is highly sig-
nificant as well. The next two models (III + IV) indicate the delayed effect of privatisa-
tion. The effect of L1_REVENUE turned out to be similar to that of REVENUE. In both 
of these models, the reform processes increase consumer benefits significantly. The 
faster the state reduced its weight in the telecommunication sector, the more the con-
sumer benefits. Nonetheless, for Model I through IV the internet dummy turns out to be 
insignificant. We also tested GDP growth as a proxy for technological progress; how-
ever, the results are similar and insignificant. For Model I through IV, the stock market 
variable is highly significant, which is consistent with the theoretical predictions.  
The last two regressions (V and VI) were estimated with a fixed effect vector de-
composition model. Model VI additionally includes an interaction term between privati-
sation and competition (REV_COMP). With the interaction term, we tested whether 
NPM reforms individually affect consumer benefits or if the effect is only felt in combi-
nation with a competitive environment. It was found that the estimated coefficient of the 
interaction variable is highly significant. This means that the effect of privatisation on 
consumer benefits is particularly strong when the level of competition is low; however, 
as soon as a competitive environment develops, the influence of privatisation is dimin-
ished and vice versa. Nonetheless, the interaction shows that each variable on its own is 
significant, thus stressing the relevance of privatisation. Additionally, the fixed effect 
vector decomposition models enable us to include important time-invariant variables.16 
These variables are the initial public sector size at the beginning of our observation pe-
riod in 1980 and population density. The results reveal some remarkable aspects. The 
effect of the population density is negative and highly significant. This contradicts the 
theoretical prediction that the transfer of efficiency gains to the consumer is more likely 
with a higher population density. Regarding New Public Management Reforms, our 
index is highly significant with a negative sign. The faster the state retreats, the more 
the consumer benefits. However, the initial size of the public sector has a positive sign. 
We interpret this as follows: the higher the initial size, the higher the potential for effi-
ciency gains and, hence, the more the consumer can benefit from a reform. If the tele-
                                                 
16  This approach is also suitable since cross country variance is for some variables higher than within variance.  
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communication provider has not yet formally been privatised, our index has high values. 
The positive sign of the initial level of public sector ownership, which essentially repre-
sent the time period before formal restructuring, implies that a high marginal effect 
takes place during the time of the restructuring, rather than during the divestment pe-
riod. Formal privatisation, therefore, particularly frees up the potential of consumer 
benefits. Furthermore, GDP per capita turns out to be significant, although with a small 
effect.17 For models V and VI, the stock market variable is highly significant, thus 
stressing the importance of external finance and favourable market conditions.  
In sum, our hypothesis is largely confirmed over all specific models. Privatisation by 
itself has a significant positive impact on the consumer, although the regulatory envi-
ronment plays a decisive role as well.  
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper analyses the effect of privatisation reforms on consumer benefits as a central 
New Public Management instrument in the telecommunications sector. For this purpose, 
we have presented a new self-compiled database of public entrepreneurship in the tele-
communications sectors of 15 European countries during the period 1980 to 2006. The 
desire to develop a new indicator stems from the fact that for international comparisons, 
quantitative empirical studies merely consider the material dimension of privatisation 
and inaccurately measure this phenomenon. Our new indicator, the index of public en-
trepreneurship, offers a unique opportunity to comprehensively depict privatisation by 
integrating formal privatisation – a change in legal status to more market-oriented or-
ganisational forms – and material privatisation – the divestment of public enterprises.   
First, we presented descriptive results for the given privatisations and consumer 
benefits. The data show clear convergence trends, although countries differ greatly in 
timing, initial magnitude and the dynamics of the reform process. Moreover, consumer 
benefits have increased in all countries, although not to the same extent. Our study 
poses the question of whether these increases in consumer benefits are caused by priva-
tisation policies.  
To analyse our research question, several panel data techniques were applied. The es-
timations reveal remarkable results. First, the research literature often argues that priva-
tisation only has a positive impact on consumer benefits in combination with a competi-
tive environment. Our results demonstrate that the opposite holds true. Privatisation is 
particularly important when the competitive environment is restrictive. Apart from this, 
we find that privatisation brings about consumer benefits on its own. Second, in contrast 
                                                 
17  This is mainly due to the fact that the Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition Model is particularly suitable for esti-
mating the effect of rarely changing and time invariant variables. 
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to the economic literature, which stresses the effect of material privatisation on effi-
ciency, we show that formal privatisation is an important instrument in increasing bene-
fits for the consumer. Formally privatised companies normally operate in a monopolistic 
environment. The high influence privatisation has in non-competitive environments, in 
particular, confirms the importance of formal privatisation. Third, consumer benefits 
emerge above all at the beginning of the reform process. The lower the level of state 
participation, the lower the marginal consumer benefits when the state further reduces 
its participation.  
In sum, our results strongly confirm that privatisation has a significant impact, and 
that it has, in particular, benefited the consumer in Europe.  
REFERENCES 
Boes, D. (1986). Public Enterprise Economics: Theory and Application. Amsterdam: North Holland. 
Bortolotti, B. & Faccio, M. (2008). Government Control of Privatized Firms. Review of Financial Stud-
ies, 1, 1-33. 
Bortolotti, B., D’Souza, J., Fantini, M., and Megginson, W.L. (2002). Privatization and the Sources of 
Performance Improvement in the Global Telecommunication Industry. Telecommunications Policy, 
26, 243-268. 
Bortolotti, B. & Siniscalco, D. (2004). The Challenges of Privatization: An International Analysis. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.  
Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.C., Guedhami, O. (2005). Postprivatization corporate governance: The Role of 
ownership structure and investor protection. Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 369-399. 
Bourbakri, N. & Cosset, J.C. (1997). The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized 
Firms: Evidence from Developing Countries. The Journal of Finance 53, 1081–1110. 
Boycko, M., Vishny, R.W., Shleifer, A. (1996). A Theory of Privatisation. Economic Journal, 106, 309-
319. 
Boylaud, O. & Nicoletti, N. (2000). Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Telecommunica-
tions. Economics Department Working Paper No. 237, Paris: OECD. 
Calabrese, A., Campisi, D., Mancuso, P. (2002). Productivity Change in the Telecommunications Indus-
tries of 13 OECD countries. International Journal of Business and Economics, 3, 209-223.  
Coffee, J. C. Jr (1999). Privatization and Corporate Governance: Lessons from Securities Market Failure. 
Columbia Law School Working Paper No. 158. 
Conway, P. & Nicoletti, G. (2006): Product Market Regulation in Non-Manufacturing Sectors in OECD 
Countries: Measurement and Highlights. OECD Economics Department Working Paper, Paris. 
Daintith, T. (1994). The Legal Techniques of Privatisation. In T. Clarke (Ed.), International Privatisation: 
Strategies and Practices (pp. 43-77). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
D’Souza, J., Megginson, W.,  Nash, R. (2005). Effect of institutional and form specific characteristics on 
post-privatization performance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 11, 747-766. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 116) 
- 19 - 
D’Souza, J. and W. Megginson (1998).  The Financial and Operating Performance of Privatized Firms 
During the 1990's. mimeo. Department of Finance, Terry College of Business, The University of 
Georgis, Athens, GA.   
Demirgüc-Kunt, A. & Maksimovic, V. (1998). Law, Finance and Firm Gowth. Journal of Finance, 53, 
2107-2137. 
Flecker, J., Hermann, C., Brandt, T., Böhlke, N., Thörnqvist, C. (2008). Liberalisation and privatisation of 
public services – company reactions. Vienna: PIQUE. 
Hausman, J.A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrics, 46, 1251-1271 
ITU (2007). World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database. Geneva: ITU. 
Karpoff, J.M. (2001). Public versus Private Initiative in Artic Exploration: The Effects of Incentives and 
Organizational Structure. The Journal of Political Economy, 109, 38-78. 
Kilicaslan, Y., Pond, R., Tasiran, A. C. (2008). Liberalisation and Privatisation of Public Services and the 
Impact on Productivity. London: PIQUE.  
Kwoka, J. E. (1993). The Effects of Divestiture, Privatization, and Competition on Productivity in U.S. 
and U.K. Telecommunications. Review of Industrial Organization, 8, 49-61. 
Laffont, J.J., & Tirole, J. (1991). Privatization and Incentives. Journal of Law, Economics and Organiza-
tion, 7, 84-105. 
Laffont, J.J., and Tirole, J. (1993). A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Lane, J.-E. (1997). Why Public Joint Stock Companies? In K. Koenig & A. Benz (Ed.), Privatisierung 
und staatliche Regulierung. Bahn, Post und Telekommunikation, Rundfunk (pp. 592-605). Baden-
Baden: Nomos. 
Lane, J.-E. (2000). New Public Management. London: Sage. 
Lien, D. & Peng, Y. (2001). Competition and production efficiency Telecommunications in OECD coun-
tries. Information Economics and Policy, 13, 51-76. 
McNary, R. (2001). The Network Penetration Effects of Telecommunications Privatization and Competi-
tion. Public Policy, 58, 222-235. 
Megginson, W. L. & Netter, J. M. (2001). From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Priva-
tization. Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 321-389. 
Meyers F, & Verhoest, K. (2006). Performance of public sector organizations: do management instru-
ments matter? ‘A Performing Public Sector: The Second transatlantic Dialogue (2TAD)’. 
http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/ 
pubpdf/IO02060022v_politicologenetmaal2006.pdf. Accessed 29 July 2009. 
Mueller, Dennis (2003). Public Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Munari, F., Roberts, E.B., Sobrero, M. (2002). Privatization processes and the redefinition of corporate 
R&D boundaries. Research Policy, 31, 31-53. 
Noam, E. (2004). Telecommunications: from utility to volatility. Utilities Policy, 12, 1-4. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 116) 
- 20 - 
Etling, A., Mause, K., Obinger, H., Schmitt, C., Schreeb, K., Schuster, P. Traub, S. (2009). The Retreat of 
the State From Entrepreneurial Activities: An Integrative Survey. TransState Working Papers No. 
107. 
OECD (2003). Privatising State-Owned Enterprises: An Overview of Policies and Practices in OECD 
Countries. Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2005). Modernising government. Paris: OECD. 
Pagano, M. & Volpin, P.F. (2005). The Political Economy of Corporate Governance. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 95, 1005-1030. 
PIQUE (2009). Privatisation of Public services and the Impact on Quality, Employment and Productivity. 
Summary Report. Vienna: PIQUE.  
Plümper, T. & Troeger, V. (2007). Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables 
in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects. Political Analysis, 15, 124-139.  
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2004). Public Management Reform. A Comparative Analysis. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press. 
Pollitt, C., Thiel, S.V., Homburg, V.M.F. (2007). The New Public Management in Europe: Adaption and 
Alternatives. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Ros, A. (1999). Does Ownership or Competition Matter? The Effects of Telecommunications Reform on 
Network Expansion and Efficiency. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 15, 65-92. 
Sappington, D.E. & Stiglitz, J. (1987). Privatization, Information, and Incentives. Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management, 6, 567-582. 
Schmidt, K. (1990). The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracting Approach. Dis-
cussion Paper No. A-287. University of Bonn: Bonn. 
Shapiro, C. & Willig, R. (1990). Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization. In E.N. Suleiman, & 
J. Waterbury (Eds.), The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization. Westview 
Press: San Francisco, CA. 
Sheshinski, E. & López-Calva, L. F. (2003). Privatization and its Benefits: Theory and Evidence. CESifo  
Economic Studies, 49, 429-459. 
Shleifer, A. (1998). State versus Private Ownership. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 133-150. 
Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R.W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance. The Journal of Finance, 52, 
737-783. 
Short, H. (1994). Ownership, Control Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms. Journal of Eco-
nomic Surveys, 8, 203-249. 
Thynne, I. (1994). The Incorporated Company as an Instrument of Government: A Quest for Comparative 
Understanding. Governance, 7, 59-82. 
Vael, T., Vandekerckhove, S., Gyes, G. V., Roosbroek, S. V., Verhoest, K., Coppin, L. (2008). Liberali-
sation in services of general economic interest. A bottom up citizens’ perspective. Analysis of the 
PIQUE Survey. Leuven: PIQUE. 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 116) 
- 21 - 
Villalonga, B. (2000). Privatization and efficiency, differentiating ownership effects from political, organ-
izational, and dynamic effects. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 42, 43-74. 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Wright, M., Hoskisson, R.E., Busenitz, L.W., Dial, J. (2000). Entrepreneurial Growth through Privatiza-
tion: The Upside of Management Buyouts. The Academy of Management Review, 25, 591-601. 
Zahra, S.A., Ireland, R.D., Gitierrez, I., Hitt, M.A. (2000). Privatization and Entrepreneurial Transforma-
tion: Emerging Issues and a Future Research Agenda. The Academy of Management Review, 25, 509-
524. 
 
  
- 22 - 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 116) 
 
A
PP
E
N
D
IX
 
Ta
bl
e 
A1
: Q
ua
lit
at
iv
e 
D
at
a 
fo
r t
he
 S
am
pl
e 
Co
m
pa
ny
 N
am
e 
Ty
pe
 o
f  
En
te
rp
ri
se
 
Ye
ar
 
Fo
un
de
d 
Ty
pe
 o
f F
or
m
al
 
Pr
iv
at
isa
tio
n*
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
O
w
ne
r-
sh
ip
 
Pu
bl
ic
 O
w
n-
er
sh
ip
 b
ef
or
e 
Fi
rs
t S
al
e 
M
at
er
ia
l P
riv
at
isa
tio
n 
(Y
ea
r o
f S
al
e 
an
d 
%
 o
f c
ap
ita
l s
ol
d 
by
 th
e 
st
at
e)
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
Te
le
ko
m
 A
us
tri
a 
A
G
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
18
87
 
19
96
: I
II
 
25
.2
%
 
10
0%
 
19
97
: 5
.7
%
, 1
99
8:
 1
9.
4%
, 2
00
0:
 2
7.
2%
,  
20
04
: 1
7.
6%
, 2
00
6:
 4
.9
%
 
A
us
tri
a 
B
el
ga
co
m
 
St
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
 
19
92
: I
, 1
99
4:
 II
 
51
%
 
10
0%
 
19
96
: 4
9%
 
B
el
gi
um
 
D
an
sk
e 
Te
le
co
m
 
A
/S
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
19
99
 
- 
0%
 
22
%
 
20
04
: 2
2%
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
Te
le
 D
an
m
ar
k 
A
/S
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
19
27
 
19
87
: I
 , 
19
90
: I
I 
0%
 
10
0%
 
19
93
: 4
%
, 1
99
4:
 4
0%
, 1
99
7:
 5
6 
%
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
So
ne
ra
  
C
or
po
ra
tio
n 
- 
19
17
 
19
94
: I
, 1
99
7:
 II
 
- 
10
0%
 
19
98
: 2
2.
2%
, 1
99
9:
 1
9.
9%
, 2
00
0:
 3
.1
%
,  
20
02
: 6
4.
8 
Fi
nl
an
d 
Su
om
en
 E
ril
lis
-
ve
rk
ot
 O
y 
St
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
19
99
 
- 
10
0%
 
0%
 
20
02
: 6
0%
, 2
00
5:
 4
0%
 
Fi
nl
an
d 
Tu
ru
n 
 
A
se
nn
us
pa
ja
 O
y 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
 
- 
0%
 
10
0%
 
19
91
: 1
00
%
 
Fi
nl
an
d 
Te
lia
 S
on
er
a 
A
B
 
(F
IN
) 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
20
02
 
- 
13
.7
%
 
19
.3
6%
 
20
03
: 0
.2
9%
, 2
00
4:
 5
.3
4%
, 2
00
5:
 0
.0
3%
 
Fi
nl
an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 T
el
ek
om
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
18
89
 
19
88
: I
, 1
99
6:
 II
 
27
%
 
10
0%
 
19
96
: 2
1 
%
, 1
99
8:
 1
7 
%
, 2
00
0:
 6
.9
 %
,  
20
01
: 1
4.
02
 %
, 2
00
4:
 8
.6
3 
%
, 2
00
7:
 5
.1
1 
%
,  
20
08
: 0
.6
9 
%
 
Fr
an
ce
 
Te
le
ko
m
 A
G
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
19
95
 
19
90
: I
, 1
99
5:
 II
 
 
14
.8
3%
 
10
0%
 
19
96
: 2
6.
0%
 1
99
7:
 1
3.
6%
, 1
99
8:
 1
1%
,  
19
99
: 6
.2
2%
, 2
00
0:
 0
.3
5%
, 2
00
1:
 1
1.
91
%
, 
20
02
: 0
.1
7%
, 2
00
3:
 4
.7
2%
, 2
00
4:
 3
.2
9,
  
20
05
: 7
.3
4%
, 2
00
6:
 0
.5
7%
 
G
er
m
an
y 
H
el
le
ni
cs
 T
el
e-
co
m
m
ui
nc
at
io
ns
 
O
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 
(O
TE
) 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
 
- 
25
%
 
10
0%
 
19
96
: 5
.7
%
, 1
99
7:
 1
9,
2%
; 1
99
8:
 1
0.
1 
%
,  
19
99
: 1
4%
, 2
00
0:
 - 
1.
44
 %
, 2
00
1:
 1
0.
44
 %
, 
20
02
: 8
.3
 %
, 2
00
4:
 -0
.9
1 
%
, 2
00
5:
 -1
.0
2 
%
,  
20
06
: -
3.
07
 %
, 2
00
7:
 1
0.
7%
, 2
00
8:
 3
%
 
G
re
ec
e 
  
- 23 - 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 116) 
 
Co
m
pa
ny
 N
am
e 
Ty
pe
 o
f  
En
te
rp
ri
se
 
Ye
ar
 
Fo
un
de
d 
Ty
pe
 o
f F
or
m
al
 
Pr
iv
at
isa
tio
n*
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
O
w
ne
r-
sh
ip
 
Pu
bl
ic
 O
w
n-
er
sh
ip
 b
ef
or
e 
Fi
rs
t S
al
e 
M
at
er
ia
l P
riv
at
isa
tio
n 
(Y
ea
r o
f S
al
e 
an
d 
%
 o
f c
ap
ita
l s
ol
d 
by
 th
e 
st
at
e)
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
Ei
rc
om
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
 
19
84
: I
, 1
98
6:
 II
 
0%
 
10
0%
 
19
96
: 2
0%
, 1
99
9:
 8
0%
 
Ir
el
an
d 
K
on
in
kl
ijk
e 
PT
T 
N
ed
er
la
nd
 (K
PN
) 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
18
52
 
 
19
89
: I
I 
0 
%
 
10
0 
%
 
19
94
 3
0%
, 1
99
5 
25
%
, 2
00
0:
 5
%
, 2
00
3:
 1
2%
, 
20
05
: 6
%
, 2
00
6:
 2
2%
 
N
et
he
r-
la
nd
s 
Te
le
no
r A
SA
 
SC
 
18
55
 
19
88
: I
, 1
99
4:
 II
 
53
.9
7%
 
10
0%
 
20
00
:2
2.
3 
%
, 2
00
3:
 1
5.
6%
, 2
00
4:
8.
1%
 
N
or
w
ay
 
Po
rtu
ga
l T
el
ec
om
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
19
68
 
19
70
: I
, 1
98
9:
 II
 
0%
 
10
0%
 
19
95
: 2
7.
26
%
, 1
99
6:
 2
1.
74
%
, 1
99
7:
 2
6%
, 
19
99
: 1
3.
5%
, 2
00
0:
 1
1.
5 
Po
rtu
ga
l 
R
et
ev
is
io
n 
98
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
19
89
 
19
96
: I
I 
0%
 
10
0%
 
20
00
: 1
00
%
 
Sp
ai
n 
TE
LE
FO
N
IC
A
 
 
19
24
 
- 
0%
 
33
.8
3%
 
19
88
: 4
.5
5%
, 1
99
4:
 -1
.7
2%
, 1
99
5:
 1
0.
71
%
, 
19
97
: 2
0.
5%
, 1
99
8:
 0
.2
4%
, 1
99
9:
 0
.3
1%
 
Sp
ai
n 
TI
SA
 –
 T
el
ef
on
ic
a 
In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l 
 
19
92
 
- 
0%
 
23
.7
8%
 
19
97
: 2
3.
8%
 
Sp
ai
n 
Te
lia
 A
B
 
- 
 
19
93
: I
I 
0%
 
10
0%
 
20
00
: 3
0%
, 2
00
2:
 7
0%
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Te
lia
So
ne
ra
 A
B
 
(S
W
E)
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
20
02
 
- 
37
.3
%
 
46
%
 
20
03
: 0
.7
%
, 2
00
7:
 8
%
 
Sw
ed
en
 
Sw
is
sc
om
 A
G
 
St
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
18
49
 
19
98
 : 
II
I 
52
%
 
10
0%
 
19
98
: 3
4.
5%
, 2
00
2:
 2
.8
%
, 2
00
4:
 0
.2
%
,  
20
06
: 7
.7
%
, 2
00
7:
 2
.8
%
, 2
00
8:
 -3
.2
%
 
Sw
itz
er
-
la
nd
 
B
rit
is
h 
Te
le
co
m
 
pl
c 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
18
46
 
19
81
: I
I 
0%
 
10
0%
 
19
84
: 5
2.
4%
, 1
99
1:
 2
1%
, 1
99
3:
 2
6.
6%
 
U
K
 
C
ab
le
 a
nd
  
W
ire
le
ss
 p
lc
 
Pr
iv
at
e 
 
C
om
pa
ny
 
18
60
 
- 
0%
 
10
0%
 
19
81
: 5
0%
, 1
98
3:
 2
7%
, 1
98
5:
 2
3%
 
U
K
 
N
ot
e:
  *
 T
yp
e 
of
 F
or
m
al
  P
riv
at
is
at
io
n:
  
I: 
Tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ta
l a
ge
nc
y 
to
w
ar
ds
 a
 p
ub
lic
 c
or
po
ra
tio
n 
II
: T
ra
ns
fo
rm
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
 p
ub
lic
 c
or
po
ra
tio
n 
to
w
ar
ds
 a
 st
at
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
II
I: 
Tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
fr
om
 a
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ta
l a
ge
nc
y 
di
re
ct
ly
 to
w
ar
ds
 a
 st
at
e 
co
m
pa
ny
 
Fo
r d
et
ai
ls
 p
le
as
e 
be
 re
fe
rr
ed
 to
 p
. 7
 
Sfb 597 „Staatlichkeit im Wandel“ - „Transformations of the State“ (WP 116) 
- 24 - 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 
Carina Schmitt and Philipp B. Schuster are research fellows at the Collaborative Re-
search Center “Transformations of the State”, University of Bremen.  
Carina Schmitt 
Telephone:  +49 421 218 7860 
E-Mail: carina.schmitt@sfb597.uni-bremen.de  
Philipp B. Schuster 
Telephone:  +49 421 218 8711 
E-Mail: philipp.schuster@sfb597.uni-bremen.de 
 
Fax:  +49 421 218-8721 
Address: University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center „Transfor-
mations of the State“, Linzer Strasse 9a, D 28359 Bremen 
 
